A joint venture is the most common way for a local operator with expertise but limited capital to own institutional-quality real estate. One party, the operating partner, finds the asset, runs the business plan and contributes a small share of the equity. The other, the capital partner, contributes most of the equity and shares in major decisions. Our published criteria state that our joint ventures are typically 90/10 with an operating partner: we contribute about 90% of the equity and the operating partner about 10%.
This entry explains how such a venture is usually built, the terms that matter most, and how we think about them as a long-term partner.
The basic shape
A real estate joint venture is usually a limited liability company formed to own a single asset or a small group of related assets. The venture’s governing document, the operating agreement, sets out who contributes what, who decides what, and how cash is shared.
| Element | Typical market practice | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Equity split | Capital partner 80–95%, operating partner 5–20% | The operator’s co-investment is meaningful to them, which aligns interests |
| Preferred return | A hurdle return to all equity before the operator earns extra | Protects the capital partner’s base case |
| Promote | A disproportionate share of profits above the hurdle, paid to the operator | Rewards outperformance rather than activity |
| Major decisions | Listed decisions requiring both partners’ consent | Defines real control |
| Fees | Property management, construction management, sometimes acquisition fees | Pays for work; should not be a profit center on its own |
| Exit rights | Buy-sell, forced sale, transfer restrictions | Determines what happens when partners disagree |
These are general market ranges, not a statement of our terms. Every venture we enter is negotiated on its own merits.
Distribution waterfalls, step by step
The waterfall is the order in which cash is distributed. A simple, common form looks like this:
- Return of capital and preferred return. Distributable cash goes to both partners pro rata until each has received its capital plus a preferred return (often in the range of 7–9% a year, compounded).
- First promote tier. Above that hurdle, cash is split with an extra share to the operator, for example 80/20 rather than 90/10, until a higher return hurdle is reached.
- Further tiers. Above a second hurdle, the operator’s share rises again, for example to 70/30.
Illustrative arithmetic only. Suppose a venture is capitalized with $20M of equity, $18M from the capital partner and $2M from the operator. Over the hold the asset distributes $40M in total. After both partners receive their $20M of capital and an 8% preferred return, suppose $12M remains. If that $12M is split 80/20 instead of 90/10, the operator receives $2.4M of it rather than $1.2M. The extra $1.2M is the promote: the reward for producing results above the hurdle.
Two details deserve attention. First, whether the preferred return is measured as an IRR, an equity multiple, or both: IRR hurdles reward speed, multiple hurdles reward total profit, and on a long hold the difference can be large (see IRR versus equity multiple). Second, whether the promote is calculated and paid during the hold or only at a capital event. For a permanent owner, a structure that allows the promote to be measured at a refinancing or at agreed intervals can matter, because there may be no sale for a long time.
Control and major decisions
Most of the day-to-day running of the asset belongs to the operating partner. The capital partner typically has consent rights over a defined list of major decisions, such as:
- buying, selling or refinancing the property;
- approving the annual budget and business plan, and material deviations from them;
- leases above a stated size, or with unusual terms;
- capital projects above a threshold;
- related-party contracts, including with the operator’s own affiliates;
- admitting new partners or changing the manager.
Most operating agreements also allow the capital partner to remove the operator as manager for defined causes, such as fraud, gross negligence, a material uncured default, or a sustained failure to meet the business plan. Removal usually reduces or eliminates the operator’s promote. Well-drafted agreements make those triggers specific, so neither side is left arguing over what “cause” means.
Capital calls and dilution
Business plans often need more capital than planned, whether for a roof that fails early, a lease-up that takes longer, or a loan that must be paid down at refinancing. A good operating agreement says how additional capital is called, how quickly partners must respond, and what happens if one cannot contribute. Common remedies include dilution of the non-contributing partner’s interest, or a member loan at a penalty rate.
This is one place where the identity of the capital partner matters. A capital partner with patient capital can meet a reasonable call promptly and is not itself facing a deadline. Our view is that a joint venture works best when both partners know in advance how a shortfall will be handled.
How we think about joint ventures
The published standard is short. In a joint venture, partners invest directly alongside Caldrion in the asset, never into a Caldrion vehicle. The operating partner brings local knowledge and day-to-day execution; Caldrion brings the equity, the patience and an owner’s perspective on capital decisions.
We look for partners with deep local knowledge and a demonstrable history of executing value-add business plans in their submarket, who want a capital partner that is still there when the plan takes longer than expected. In practice we ask:
- What have you done, in this submarket, with this property type? Show us the business plans and what actually happened.
- Who on your team will run this asset, and how much of their time does it get?
- How do you manage the property: in-house, or through a third party you oversee?
- What would make you want to sell, and what would make you want to hold?
Red flags on either side
- A business plan that relies on rent growth well above the submarket’s history.
- Fees that earn the operator more than its promote is likely to.
- A co-investment that is mostly deferred fees rather than cash.
- A capital partner whose own timeline forces a sale before the plan is finished.
- Vague major-decision lists, or none at all.
What to send
If you are an operating partner with an asset under contract or in view, send the offering memorandum or executive summary, the T-12 and rent roll, a capex budget if there is one, and a short note on your history in the submarket. Our criteria set out the sizes we look at: transactions of $20M–$150M in gross asset value with equity checks of $10M–$75M. The process page explains what happens next, and what to send a real estate buyer goes into detail on the package.
This entry is general information as of November 2026, not investment, legal or tax advice, and not an offer of securities.